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Abstract 
This chapter examines material published in the field of digital humanities in 2017. Owing to 
controversial developments in the political sphere, public awareness of the role of big data in 
our lives has grown. Anxieties about ‘microtargetting’ and ‘dataveillance’ inflect our 
increasingly troubled relationship with computational culture, particularly as the 
commercialization of the internet and its fragmentation into proprietary platforms, means that 
algorithmic and machine-learning processes are hidden away from scrutiny in ‘black box’ 
systems. Books by Nick Srnicek and Richard J. Lane discuss the turn towards big data and 
platforms, as well as detailing the ways in which humanities scholars might engage with such 
transformations. A second strand of digital culture looks at the relationship between humanity 
and machines, with the material turn encouraging more sustained examination of ‘digital 
bodies’. This is the name of the collection edited by Susan Broadhurst and Sara Price, who 
bring together essays on this from a range of artists, performers, fashion designers, and 
sociologists. Looking at the augmentation of humanity by the digital, Adam Pilsch aims to 
rehabilitate the transhumanist movement in scholarly circles, by relocating it within a longer 
tradition of utopian evolutionary futurism that can be traced back to the early twentieth 
century. By contrast, N. Katherine Hayles turns to cognitive processes, arguing that recent 
discoveries in neuroscience regarding nonconscious cognition, can realign our understanding 
of the relationship between humanity and machine. The final part of this chapter looks at 
recent monographs by David Berry and Anders Fagerjord and by James Smithies that propose 
new inflections of the digital humanities in response to the challenges outlined in the 
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foregoing discussion. 
 
 
 
After surveying a number of publications that dealt with big data and the quantification of 
human identity, last year’s chapter on digital humanities (DH) concluded rather forebodingly 
with a reference to Cambridge Analytica. In the intervening period between last year’s 
chapter and this, the alleged misuse of big data in the Brexit referendum, the 2016 US 
Presidential election, and other national elections, and its potential to subvert democratic 
processes became mainstream news. Social media users’ interactions with seemingly 
innocuous quizzes on Facebook, for example, enabled Cambridge Analytica to generate five 
thousand ‘data points’ on 220 million American citizens, which were were then analysed 
using a range of algorithms as a means of predicting or influencing voting behaviour. As we 
move ever more deeply into the algorithmic age, our lives are governed, our identities 
constrained, and our futures shaped by digital processes. While we haven’t yet reached the 
‘Singularity’—a term used by transhumanist Ray Kurzweil to describe the moment when 
machine intelligence will exceed all of humanity’s collective intelligence—as machine 
learning becomes increasingly complex, our understanding of protocols that control so much 
of our lives is becoming increasingly mystified. If the nascent internet of the 1990s was like 
the Wild West, a sort of free-for-all in open territory, the Web 2.0 era represented by the 
social media giants like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, has seen the commercialization of 
that ‘open territory’. Not only is our humanity ‘normalized’ online through avatars that fit 
predetermined templates provided by these platforms: as commercial enterprises these 
systems remain ‘black-boxed’ to us, with the divide between us and our data growing deeper 
and wider.  
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If we find it difficult to manage our personal data—where they goes, who sees them, what 
is done with them—on whom can we rely to oversee the zettabytes of this digital effulgence 
in the epoch of big data? In 2010, following a noble humanistic tradition established centuries 
ago, the Library of Congress thought it could  attend to part of this task by archiving all the 
public tweets issued on Twitter from its first tweet of 21 March 2006 onwards. By the end of 
2017, the LoC announced enough was enough, and that it would only deposit tweets 
selectively with effect from 1 January 2018. As Amanda Petrusich notes in her blog post for 
The New Yorker on this decision: ‘Healthy consumption of the Internet requires curation. 
Though reading widely and expansively offline remains crucial, the present Internet deluge 
still means we all have to make serious choices about what we let in.’ (Petrusich, ‘The Library 
of Congress Quits Twitter’). The books discussed in this chapter all share a concern 
preoccupation with the challenge of ‘what we let in’—and indeed ‘where we let ourselves 
go’—concerning themselves with three core questions: the role of datafication and platforms 
in the age of big data; the relationship between cognition and presence as our bodies become 
increasingly digitalized; and the role that can be played by digital humanists in responding to 
these phenomena.   
Nick Srnicek’s Platform Capitalism explores the transformation of businesses into 
platforms—businesses that provide the digital infrastructure for other businesses (such as 
Google, Facebook, and Microsoft). Srnicek’s focus, much like that of the global market itself, 
is away from labour and towards capital raised within the digital economy. This digital 
economy comprises more than simply the technology sector, cutting through most sectors, 
and legitimates capitalism by its seeming disruptiveness: ‘The digital economy is bursting 
becoming a hegemonic model: cities are to become smart, businesses must be disruptive, 
workers are to become flexible, and governments must be lean and intelligent’ (p. 5). 
Platform Capitalism explores the shift in capitalism, from manufacturing to data processing, 
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and the coterminous emergence of platforms in directing global markets. The apparent 
novelty of these shifts, Srnicek argues, in fact belies much longer-standing trajectories in the 
market; moreover, the capitalist imperatives of efficiency and competition ineluctably 
demand constant technological change in order to lower the costs of production.  
Platform Capitalism begins with an economic history of three crises that have led to the 
present situation: the response to the economic downturn during the 1970s; the boom-and-
bust cycles of the 1990s; the reaction to the 2008 financial crisis. Post-WW2 economies were 
characterized by a Fordist–Taylorist model of mass production and the separation of labour 
into small, lower-skilled tasks and processes. This post-war period was an atypical ‘golden 
age’ for American capitalism and manufacturing, and such that an increasingly globalized 
marketplace put pressure on US profits from the 1960s. This led the US to undertake a series 
of economic policies and activities in the 1960s and 1970s that culminated in the global crisis 
of the later 1970s. Competitiveness in the market led to a push towards overproduction (and 
therefore less profit), while a concurrent attack on the power of the unions weakened workers’ 
benefits and lowered liability costs. The 1970s laid the ground for the 1990s’ ‘’dot-com 
boom’, which established the infrastructure for the digital market economy of today. In 
particular, the 1990s saw the commercialization of the internet, driven in no small measure by 
venture capitalism, which realigned the focus of economy from manufacturing to telecoms, 
which in turn drove further technological advances in infrastructure. However, such growth 
was to be short-lived: the dot-com bust at the turn of the millennium led to the deregulation of 
monetary policies that itself culminated in the much larger crisis of 2008 and the subsequent 
era of austerity. This made further economic stimulation based on renewed infrastructure 
projects that would generate labour a political impossibility, pushing investors into riskier, 
digital ventures combined with cash-hoarding and offshoring of liquid assets—especially by 
tech companies. As Srnicek notes, ‘Tax evasion, austerity, and extraordinary monetary 
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policies are all mutually reinforcing’ (p. 33), and inevitably such economic behaviour impacts 
on the labour market, leading to stagnation and precarity. 
When crises hit, capitalism recalibrates itself accordingly: we now live in an economy that 
can be defined as ‘cognitive’, ‘informational’, or ‘knowledge’-based. Hence, ‘some argue that 
the economy today is dominated by a new class, which does not own the means of production 
but rather has ownership over information’ (p. 38; original emphasis). However, the old 
business models are no longer appropriate for this new material, requiring instead an equally 
innovative model: ‘Platforms, in sum, are a new type of firm; they are characterised by 
providing the infrastructure, the intermediary  to intermediate between the different user 
groups, by displaying minority monopoly tendencies driven by network effects, by employing 
cross-subsidiszation to draw in different user groups, and by having a designed core 
architecture that governs the interaction possibilities’ (p. 48). Srnicek outlines five types of 
platforms: advertising platforms (like Google and Facebook), which provide a service for free 
while harvesting user data; cloud platforms (such as Amazon Web Services and Salesforce), 
which supply software and hardware infrastructure;  industrial platforms (for instance, 
Siemens and GE), which are transforming traditional manufacturing into internet-connected 
processes; product platforms (like Rolls Royce and Spotify), which transforms goods into 
services through rental or subscription; lean platforms (most notably, Uber and AirBnB), 
which reduce ownership of assets by the business to an absolute minimum and in ordert to 
profit by reducing costs. It is interesting to note that, in Srnicek’s estimation, Amazon spans 
all five categories. Many of these businesses, for instance Google and Facebook, accumulate 
capital that is then stored overseas, is used on acquisitions or mergers, or is funnelled into 
startups. As Srnicek observes: ‘Enabled by digital technology, platforms emerge as the means 
to lead and control industries’ (p. 92). 
 If capitalism renews itself through the creation of new technological complexes, Srnicek 
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speculates whether information technology revive capitalism’s ‘moribund growth’ (p. 94). On 
the one hand, new platforms are monopolistic: the more greater the number of users who 
interact with the platform, the more valuable the platform becomes for each user. On the other 
hand, capitalism always supplies means for competition, and new ventures can eventually 
topple existing monopolies. However, unlike manufacturing, platforms are not judged solely 
on the differentialsces between costs and prices: instead, but data acquisition and processing 
are far more important. Many of these systems are driven by analytics, particularly artificial 
intelligence (AI), and convergence, as different platforms seek to replicate services provided 
by their competitors. Data extraction is funnelled into siloed platforms, locking users and their 
data into a specific platform, whether that be Apple’s iCloud ecosystem or Facebook. This 
phenomenon is part of a broader shift from an open to a closed web dominated by fragmented 
platforms, driven in particular by our movement from computers to smartphones as our 
primary points of access to the internet. However, platforms are themselves vulnerable to risk 
from a number of challenges. One key feature of the industrial internet is the overcapacity of 
products: as a consequence, austerity is likely to continue and production will remain in 
decline; lean platforms will be unable to provide sustained momentum; and outsourcing will 
have extended itself. The result is an inherent lack of profitability in these new models, 
particularly given that lean platforms are entirely reliant on a vast mass of surplus capital to 
mitigate immense start-up costs; however, ‘[w]hereas the tech boom of the 1990s at least left 
us with the basis for the internet, the tech boom of the 2010s looks as though it will simply 
leave us with premium services for the rich’ (p. 121). Srnicek suggests that, in terms of 
profitability, Amazon is more representative of the future in terms than Google, Facebook, 
and Uber. As such, existing socioeconomic inequalities will be reflected in access inequalities 
to the internet, resulting in a digital deficit. Platform Capitalism proposes a simple but 
profound solution to this problem: 
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 ‘Rather than just regulating corporate platforms, efforts could be made to create 
platforms—platforms owned and controlled by the people. […] More radically, we 
can push for post capitalist platforms that make use of the data collected by these 
platforms in order to distribute resources, enable democratic participation, and 
generate further technological development. Perhaps today we must collectivise the 
platforms.’ (p. 128).  
One notable scholarly response to the global shift towards platforms and datafication has 
been the rising advocacy for a ‘big humanities’ commensurate with the challenges of ‘big 
data’. The big humanities featured notably in both versions of the field-defining ‘Digital 
Humanities Manifesto’ (2008, 2009), focusing on ‘the building of bigger pictures out of the 
tesserae of expert knowledge […] [which] promotes collaboration across domains of 
expertise’ (para. 16). More recently, Mirko Tobias Schäfer and Karin van Es preface their 
collection, The Datafied Society: Studying Culture through Data (2017), by noting that ‘data 
have moved to the centre of media research and have become protagonists in media 
narratives. […] Data have become ontological and epistemological objects of research—
manifestations of social interaction and cultural production’ (p. 11). Likewise, Patrik 
Svensson’s Big Digital Humanities: Imagining a Meeting Place for the Humanities and the 
Digital (2016) proposes that ‘big’ in this case encapsulates a multiplicity of humanistic 
approaches to the digital world, rather than simply scholarship on a macro-scale: 
Big digital humanities facilitates multiple modes of engagement between the 
humanities and the digital, stretches across all of the humanities and outside, and 
functions as a platform for the humanities. According to this model, the digital 
humanities engages with the digital as a tool, as an object of inquiry, and as an 
expressive medium. (p. x) 
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Richard J. Lane’s The Big Humanities: Digital Humanities/Digital Laboratories (2017) 
grapples with this challenge by focusing on the digital laboratory as the core environment of 
the DH. His book aims to demystify the emergent field of the ‘Big Humanities’ in the same 
way that Big Science has been similarly made accessible. Lane provides a rich history of 
previous debates, drawing on a range of examples of existing digital projects, including 
Perseus, Transcribe Bentham, and The Devonshire Manuscript. Additionally, the book 
contextualizes the DH within a broader history, exploring various antecedents to the current 
debates—including the ‘Two Cultures’ controversies that ensnared Matthew Arnold and T. H. 
Huxley in the late nineteenth century and C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis in the 1960s—as well 
as drawing on Heidegger’s concept of ‘Enframing’: 
[T]technology, for Heidegger, occupies both sides of the ‘two cultures’ divide: it is 
instrumental, facilitating the physical sciences, and transforming nature and humanity 
into a quantifiable resource; but it is simultaneously that which allows humanity to 
endure as the intelligent beings who will receive and comprehend truth. (p. 33) 
 Lane proposes the laboratory as ‘the new [space] for humanistic inquiry’, in which ‘the 
shift to lab-based hybrid humanistic/scientific research practices, and the accompanying self-
reflexivity and theoretical engagement […] [has] the potential to not only[…] “rebuild” the 
otherwise declining arts and humanities’ (p. 2). In this context, the big humanities draw 
together a variety of modes: traditional humanistic activity, remediating and manipulating 
texts, employing practical skills and technology; drawing on significant funding and team 
collaboration (p. 7). Lane posits the various digital tools available to humanities scholars as 
virtual laboratories. A key example here is temporality: machine reading of large datasets in 
seconds substitutes for potential years of close reading by scholars, enabling them to direct 
their energies elsewhere, such that the ‘cycle’ of humanistic work undergoes a radical change. 
Lane also invites us to consider technology in Heideggerian terms, as ‘equipment’: ‘the tools 
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that are part of an entire environment or horizon of understanding and intention’, which both 
fulfils ‘its pre-assigned function and tak[es] that function elsewhere, perhaps a long way from 
where we thought it was going or where it should be’ (p. 34).  David Berry, in for example 
Understanding Digital Humanities (2012), has made similar claims about a multi-phasic DH, 
the latest wave of which transforms the very nature of ‘research’ through working within a 
primarily computational medium. 
 The Big Humanities explores the role of ‘collaboratories’ in today’s social internet, 
looking in particular at two cases: crowdsourcing in the Transcribe Bentham project and the 
social edition in The Devonshire Manuscript. The discussion draws on a number of responses 
to these initiatives, which range from criticisms of the positivism that substitutes data 
crunching for answering deep intellectual questions, to celebrations of the citizen- researcher 
who can now participate in humanistic enquiry. Probing these disputes, Lane observes that 
‘what is at stake here is the role of the “public intellectual” and the ways in which the broader 
academic community communicates (or not) with the general public’ (p. 62). Countering 
instrumentalist readings of such projects, he suggests that collaboratories like Transcribe 
Bentham and The Devonshire Manuscript facilitate ‘neural networks’, which that encourage 
discussion, debate, and discourse that are themselves meta-critical, even if they are not 
‘theoretical’. So, for all the talk of ‘crowds’, participation is important because of quality 
rather than quantity: ‘with the example of Transcribe Bentham, the act of transcribing can 
facilitate a deeper “active” reading, or the sort fof slow reading that leads an individual to 
reflective and critical questions that forge new modes of understanding’ (p. 81).  
 The open source movement is becoming increasingly powerful in shaping future digital 
labour, and for Lane this has important consequences for the big humanities. He helpfully 
distinguishes between the forking of the ‘open source’ and ‘free software’ movements: the 
former supporting the rights of individual curiosity to expand our knowledge and 
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understanding of how those tools are made and should function; the latter advocating for 
community access to digital resources that are now seen as essential cultural tools. The 
challenge for the humanities lies in the potential disruption that open-source philosophy can 
bring to academia, whose infrastructure typically relies on closed systems and proprietary 
platforms such as costly textbooks and commercial databases. Here, lies an essential 
challenge: if we are to be the informed stakeholders for which the open source movement 
advocates, then we must learn to code: ‘As the humanities transitions into a Big Humanities 
model, code/knowledge reuse becomes essential, freeing humanists from the costs of either 
using proprietary software or paying programmers to write entire applications from scratch’ 
(p. 105).  
Lane concludes by considering how the humanities can be reinvigorated through big data 
and distant reading. Comparing a number of linguistic corpora to astronomical datasets, Lane 
he notes that humanistic data is comparable withsimilar in magnitude to some of the largest 
scientific datasets available. However, quantity is less important than may initially be seem 
the case: there are numerous ‘big’ humanistic datasets that are comparatively small compared 
to scientific ones, yet they will be significant from a humanistic perspective and will still be 
of a much greater magnitude than the corpora traditionally examined in close textual analysis 
or literary historical surveys. As a case in point, Lane considers the restricted nature of Ian 
Watt’s The Rise of the Novel (1957), whose ‘dataset is simply too small to meaningfully 
answer any of his questions’ (p. 112). In the future, the big humanities will pre-empt such 
self-selectivity, by both emphasizing the importance of scale and providing the tools required 
to undertake more comprehensive analysis. The book finishes by considering scrutinizing 
Franco Moretti’s controversial model of ‘distant reading’, which is driven by patterns 
rendered through big data rather than the vagaries of literary tradition and historical 
contingency. The challenge, then, ‘involves shifting from the microscope to the telescope, that 
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is to say, from a limited set of books and close reading examined through the capacity of the 
human eye, to lab-based or lab-generated Big Humanities data’ (p. 119). Ultimately, the role 
of the scholar in the age of big humanities is not to provide answers, but to design tools that 
enable us to traverse the spaces and places opened up by such research. In so doing, the 
emphasis must be on crossing borders, Lane argues, rather than providing authoritative 
solutions akin to those preferred by Watt half a century ago. 
While much DH scholarship has focused on the growing digitalization of a humanity —
considered from a distance and perhaps rendered more ephemeral than ever before—, another 
strand explores the entanglements between our material and digital selves. Susan Broadhurst 
and Sara Price’s Digital Bodies: Creativity and Technology in the Arts and Humanities (2017) 
is a collection of seventeen essays that ‘illustrate the synergies and differences in the 
theoriszation of the body and technology, and how these in turn shape new or evolving 
research practices across the arts and humanities’ (pp. 1–2). The book is divided into four 
sections: ‘The Performing Body: Creativity and Technology in Performance’, ‘Designing, 
(Re)designing: Embodiment and Digital Creativity in Art Practices’, ‘Digital Aesthetics and 
Identity: Creativity in Fashion Design’, and ‘Embodied Interaction: Digital Communication 
and Meaning Making in the Social Sciences’. The essays consider how the digital body is 
both extended and reconfigured in new and transformative ways, while technology is 
correspondingly posited as something that is part of, rather than apart from, the body, altering 
and reconditioning our experience in the world.  
For the research project detailed in Susan Broadhurst’s ‘Digital Performance and 
Creativity’, participants found that, rather than being obstacles, ‘technological limits can 
become creative opportunities’ (p. 20), and that ‘the digital does what all avant-garde art does: 
it is an experimental extension of the socio-political and cultural tendencies of an era’ (p. 21). 
Digital bodies become transitive, and the boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’ blur, with 
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performer–audience relationships gaining increasing fluidity. Drawing on Wagnerian notions 
of Gesamtkunstwerke (the total artwork), Broadhurst sees the resurgence of Romantic 
aesthetics emerge in such co-mingling of the digital and the somatic. If physical and 
topological boundaries can blur in digital performance, Helga Schmid’s ‘The Embodiment of 
Time’ observes that digitality has rendered time as increasingly precise (atomistic, 
computational), making Romantic returns a challenge: ‘A leap back in time to temporal 
structures of the past does not meet contemporary living standards of individuality, autonomy 
and freedom of choice’ (p. 97). Schmid’s solution to this crisis focuses onlies in ‘uchronia’ (p. 
98), a kind of temporal utopia, suggesting and she argues that time, as we engage with it, is a 
social construct. Her performance work, which relies on embedding the body within light and 
space for hours, enables the artist to ‘unlearn’ time and overcome conventional temporal 
structures. This can elicit a productive shift: from the ‘viva activa’ superintended by 
mechanical and algorithmic time to a ‘viva contemplativa’ governed by natural and biological 
systemsrhythms. Camille Baker’s ‘Critical Interventions in Wearable Tech, Smart Fashion 
and Textiles in Art and Performance’ builds on the fact that, despite our increasing 
datafication, third parties have better access to our data than we do, with little ethical 
oversight. In Baker’s reading, the critical discourse is lacking when it comes to improving our 
personal rights over data, and understanding the existential implications of data-as-identity.  
The essay traces the work outcomes of Baker’s research network, which explored issues of 
ownership of personal data,; how identity is performed in the digital space,; and the need to 
educate the wider public about this phenomenon.  
The extension or renegotiation of boundaries through our immersion in the digital can 
manifest itself in ludic ways, as examined in a number of this collection’s chapters. Maria 
Chatzichristodolou’s ‘Karen by Blast Theory: Leaking Privacy’ looks at the artist collective 
Blast Theory, whose work deals with the socio-political functions of technology. Blast 
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Theory employs genre-warping approaches to create immersive works that cross the 
boundaries between ‘game, art, and life’, in order to critique our digital lives; the collective 
‘offers entertainment […] that is less concerned with enjoyment or pleasure (the sine qua non 
of all mainstream game design and entertainment ventures) and more with what [Blast Theory 
member Matt] Adams terms a “productive anxiety”’ (p. 68). Such productive anxiety can 
enhance our in-game experiences in three ways: as entertainment, as enlightenment, or for 
sociality. With social functions in mind, Concepts concepts of play can extend beyond the 
political and critical, into scenarios that can facilitate professional development: Caroline 
Pelletier and Roger Kneebone’s ‘Playing at Doctor’s and Nurses: Technology, Play and 
Medical Simulation’ challenges long-standing critical discourse on medical simulation. 
Scholars have typically argued that ‘fidelity’ is the most important criterion in the medical use 
of electronic substitutes or representations of the human body, which assumes transparency or 
a lack of mediation in the devices. Instead, the authors argue that ‘fidelity’ is itself socially 
constructed within the expectations of clinical practice, and that such encounters should be 
analysed through the lens of play. ‘Treating medical simulation as play does not mean treating 
it as idleness or triviality, but rather than as an activity implicated in symbolising the world 
and, consequently, in experimenting with how it can be made sense of’ (p. 241). Moreover, 
play should be understood here not as developmental (and utilitarian), but as imaginative and 
affective, depending on a host of creative traditions, such as the carnivalesque and the 
phantasmagoric. These interactions demonstrate that ‘realism’ is a product of imaginative 
play, rather than its opposite—as suchand, by extension,  STEM conventions themselves 
might be better understood with the aid of humanistic models. 
Interaction, in its most intimate manifestations, forms another key strand through Digital 
Bodies, particularly when the role of touch is examined. Laura Ferrarello’s ‘The Oxymoron of 
Touch: The Tactile Perception of Hybrid Reality through Material Feedbacks’ looks at how 
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haptic devices generate hybrid experiences that invest the digital with seemingly physical 
properties. In the digital age, ‘materiality’ intersects the physical and the virtual; Ferrarello 
uses the example of an apple, scanned into a computer as a 3D image, then manipulated as a 
digital file, before being printed using a 3D printer: ‘The oxymoron apple is the result of a 
series of material states that link the physical, digital and physical reality via an interwoven 
loop. Our mind combines information from the physical and digital reality to shape a third 
materiality’ (p. 139). As we shift further into the digital, Ferrarello argues, we must see it not 
as a simulation of the physical realm, but rather ‘the physical and the digital [should be] 
understood as a whole’ (p. 140). This fluid relationship between the two worlds is a problem 
encountered by fashion designers, according to Bruna Petreca’s ‘Giving Body to Digital 
Fashion Tools’. The main challenge is that until recently attempts to incorporate digitality 
into fashion design have sought to mimic haptic engagements in the physical world, with the 
focus falling heavily on touch, whereas there may be other sensory tools, such as sound, of 
greater benefit to designers. Petreca advocates for more nuanced encounters between 
designers and their tools and material, which involves moving beyond hands: ‘designers 
“need to feel”. Since feeling seems to involve a balance between perspecutalperceptual, 
conceptual and affective levels of experience, there is a need to balance the current realistic 
(physical) approach to textiles with the imaginary and the emotional’ (p. 201; original 
emphasis). Douglas Atkinson’s ‘Post-Industrial Fashion and the Digital Body’ examines the 
wider sociocultural interactions between fashion and the digital. Post-industrial design 
represents a major departure from traditional practices and perspectives—‘no longer shaped 
by the will of a single designer but distributed and accessible, to meet the challenges of a 
world of networked intelligence, digital tools and ecological woes’ (p. 148). Fashion has long 
resisted the digital owing to its haptic, material, and embodied principles: the today’s problem 
is that post-industrial designers are gaining digital competencies while losing access to 
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traditional material skills, leading to a divide between the certainty of the older, individual 
forms and the uncertainty of the digital, collective endeavours. With bodies increasingly 
becoming subjected to datafication, the challenge facing designers is how to meet the needs 
and practices of the new post-industrial digital age, without sacrificing the long tradition of 
materialized, embodied engagement that has given fashion its remarkable role in culture. 
Andrew Pilsch’s Transhumanism: Evolutionary Futurism and the Human Technologies of 
Utopia situates current transhumanist engagements with digitalized bodies in a broader 
sociohistorical context. Since its emergence in the 1960s, the transhumanist movement has 
celebrated the future of human potential in two ways: by means of planetary communication 
systems and through the application of radical technologies on the body to extend our 
lifespans and augment our cognitive facilities. As Pilsch notes, transhumanism has fared 
poorly in academic circles, perceived as something akin to a pseudoscientific fad at best or a 
eugenicist cult at worst. Secondly, transhumanists have tended to eschew humanist traditions, 
focusing almost solely on scientific justifications. Taking a critical approach to 
transhumanism, Pilsch nonetheless wishes to engage with it within academic circles by 
examining, in detail, the sociocultural and literary traditions that contributed to the 
development of transhumanism over the last century, particularly through its connections to 
evolutionary futurism and utopianism.  
According to Pilsch, transhumanism is ‘a rhetorical mode, a means of creating and 
seducing through language of about the future […] mapping the general flux (raw data) of 
experience into a specific program for action’ (p. 11). Moreover, he argues that 
transhumanism can be located within the tradition of twentieth-century evolutionary 
futurism—a set of rhetorical approaches that explore how machines can assist our evolution 
and betterment. Chapter 1 looks at evolutionary futurism in avant-garde circles at the start of 
the twentieth century, in particular tackling the ambiguous function of Nietzsche’s 
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Übermensch. Despite its rejection by transhumanists, Nietzsche’s ‘break from the human’ 
was influential on early evolutionary futurists, most notably in the mystical Darwinism of P. 
D. Ouspensky and the feminist futurism of Mina Loy. Chapter 2 explores the role played by 
pulp science fiction (SF) from the 1930s and evolutionary futurism. Examining A. E. Van 
Vogt’s Slan serial fiction and John W. Campbell’s stewardship of the SF magazine 
Astounding Science Fiction, Pilsch traces the how reality and fiction interacted in SF fandom. 
Perceiving themselves both as outsiders isolated from the mainstream and as Slan-like 
superhumans, SF fans and authors established a number of utopian communities grounded in 
debating the challenges facing human evolution. The next third chapter turns to examine the 
role of suffering in evolutionary futurism in the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit 
priest. Teilhard’s The Phenomenon of Man (1955) predicted a transhumanist teleology that, 
reversing traditional Christology, would lead humanity to create God as a cosmic 
consciousness. Building on the work of Paul Virilio, Jean-Françcois Lyotard, and Vladmir 
Vernadsky, Pilsch looks at Teilhard’s adoption of Vernadsky’s model of geological evolution: 
‘When the geosphere was dominant, matter increasingly complexified through rock and 
metals until giving rise to the basic elements of life (single-celled organisms). At this point, 
the biosphere began to blanket the earth as the dominant configuration of matter (moving 
from mineral to life)’; the next stage, with humanity as the dominant geological, if not 
cosmic, force, would see the emergence of the ‘noösphere’, or collective intelligence (p. 117). 
Teilhard posited that matter itself was evolving to create a force in us (as different as life is 
from the mineral world), driven purely by thought, which would eventually be shared by each 
individual cognizer as part of a cosmic consciousness. Pilsch’s fourth chapter argues for an 
‘aesthetics’ of transhumanism that counters the rationalism, which has for many years been 
the cornerstone of contemporary transhumanism. Pilsch discusses Natasha Vita-More’s 
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which argued for an aesthetics that would generate an ethical transhumanism. He then turns to 
the architectural art of Arawakawa and Gins, whose world is guided by a recognition that ‘our 
built environments, especially the ones in which we live, are part of our bodies and should be 
considered, definitionally, as such’ (pp. 142–43). More recently, the New Aesthetic 
movement has sought to counter the increasing banality of technology in our lives by 
reinvigorating it with a sense of wonder. Their responses are structured around ‘[t]he way 
humans increasingly trust algorithms and objects to make decisions for them or to answer 
questions we previously could never have asked’, signalling an essential transformation in our 
relationship with technology (p. 159). Pilsch continues to meander between high and low 
culture, by wrapping up the chapter with a brief consideration of memes, specifically the 
‘LOLcats’ phenomenon made (in)famous by the ‘ICANHASCHEEZBURGER’ meme as 
constitutive of a new language of an emergent collective consciousness still in its infancy. 
  Pilsch concludes his study by reflecting there can be no return to a pre-computational 
golden age of humanity, so we must see to locate the ‘cyborg as a Utopian figure now more 
than ever’ (p. 186). He pauses upon two radical responses that might effect such utopian 
outcomes. The first is Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek’s ‘#Accelerate: Manifesto for an 
Accelerationist Politics’ (2013), which advocates for the end of neoliberalism through the 
very technoscientific acceleration that capitalism has engendered. Acceleration is not the 
‘speeding up’ favoured by transhumanists like Ray Kurzweil and Nick Land, but ‘something 
as mutational as the introduction of print was to the human sensorium’ (p. 190)—in other 
words, a paradigm shift. Pilsch’s second utopian aim is to be found in the feminist collective 
Laboria Cuboniks’ ‘Xenofeminist Manifesto’ (2015), which reminds us that the future is 
discursively shaped by humanity, rather than reified as an objective telos. ‘[X]enofeminism 
outlines a version of history in which short-term major goals are sacrificed in favour of long-
term accomplishments’ (p. 192). This view has much in common with evolutionary futurism, 
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but is incompatible with contemporary transhumanism, which has typically emerged ‘from 
cis-gendered, white males who want to move beyond the limits of their privilege’ (p. 193). 
Rather than extending hegemonic models through technological augmentation, xenofeminism 
proposes a liberatory praxis: a ‘freedom-to’ rather than a ‘freedom-from’ (p. 194). In 
highlighting these two recent approaches to our transhuman futures, Pilsch consolidates his 
reading of an evolutionary futurist history, guided by a mastery based on probabilities rather 
than certainties—and invoking, in the Romantic spirit, a sort of Keatsian ‘Negative 
Capability’ that provides a refreshing alternative to the positivism of much transnhumanist 
discourse. 
N. Katherine Hayles’s is one of today’s leading thinkers about computational culture and 
posthumanism: her latest book, Unthought: The Power of the Cognitive Nonconscious, builds 
on recent discoveries in neuroscience ‘confirming the existence of nonconscious cognitive 
processes inaccessible to conscious introspection but nevertheless essential for conscious for 
consciousness to function’ (p. 1). Hayles’s definition of cognition can be applied to technical 
as well as biological systems—‘cognition’ here is not to be confused or conflated with 
‘thinking’, as it extends to all life forms, including plants and microorganisms: ‘Cognition is a 
process: this implies that cognition is not an attribute, such as intelligence is sometimes 
considered to be, but rather a dynamic unfolding within an environment in which its activity 
makes a difference’ (p. 25; original emphasis). Humans and machines form interdependent 
systems through ‘assemblages [that] are precisely structured by the sensors, perceptors, 
actuators, and cognitive processes of the interactors’ (p. 11)—thus, a person becomes part of a 
cognitive unconscious assemblage while talking on a mobile phone. The cognitive 
nonconscious shares similarities with theories of cybernetics, but, as Hayles points out, if 
cybernetics humanizes the machine, the ‘cognitivist paradigm’ mechanizes the mind. 
Information should not be seen as separate from the cognitive processes, but as emerging 
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from the embeddeddeness of an organism/mechanism within their environment. Hayles 
proposes a tripartite framework of for human cognition: at the top are consciousness and 
unconsciousness, modes of awareness; next is nonconscious cognition, inaccessible but linked 
to consciousness; finally, we find the material processes that form the basis of all cognitive 
activities (pp. 27–28). In this context, 
technologies develop within complex ecologies, and their trajectories follow paths that 
optimize their advantages within their ecological niches. […] Computational media 
are distinct […] because they have a stronger evolutionary potential than any other 
technology, and they have this potential because of their cognitive capabilities, which 
among other functionalities, enable them to simulate any other system. (p. 33; original 
emphasis) 
Unthought proceeds to read different attributes of cognition through the lens of the 
cognitive nonconscious, and attempts to signal the its relevance of this subject to the 
humanities: ‘At stake is whether ordinary human activities are pervaded by rationality […] or 
whether non rational processes also have important roles to play’ (p. 57). Citing recent 
findings in neuroscience that have demonstrated that the bulk of information- processing is 
not conscious at all, Hayles speculates that humanistic debates could turn ‘not on the question 
of whether humans are capable of reason […], but whether reason is central to everyday 
human action in the world’ (p. 59). These reflections are further complicated by a chapter on 
the impact of ‘the new materialisms’ in decentring the humanist subject, by their focus on 
matter as ‘lively’ and ‘vibrant’, their placement of the human on a continuum with nonhuman 
and material processes, and their emphasis on new kinds of political action. Hayles reads 
aligns her model of unthought against alongside new materialist approaches to ontology, 
evolution, and transformation, as well as Deleuzian categories like survival and force. Sharing 
the new materialists’ attempts to challenge traditional ideas about the centrality of humans in 
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the world, Hayles she identifies her framework fortheory of nonconscious cognition as 
something that ‘enlists the cognitive powers of humans […] while also insisting that 
nonhumans have cognitive powers of their own’ (pp. 84–85). 
The second part of Unthought examines the systemic effects of (human-–technical) 
cognitive assemblages, which emphasize ‘the flow of information through a system and the 
choices and decisions that create, modify, and interpret the flow’ (p. 1167). Hayles’s model 
supplements the study of power and politics missing from other systems theories, such as 
Bruno Latour’s Actor–-Network Theory. Moreover, unlike networks, which have edges and 
nodes that convey ‘a clean materiality’, assemblages ‘allow for contignuity in a fleshly sense, 
touching, incorporating, repelling, mutating’ (p. 118). Because human and technical systems 
in an assemblage interconnect, the cognitive decisions of one affects the other, and their 
hybridity raises questions of agency and responsibility. As one of her key examples, Hayles 
examines how the we can see cognitive nonconscious frameworks that operating operate in 
high-frequency trading, which relyingy on complex temporalities and illustrate illustrating the 
gap between human and ethnical cognizers., and Tracing how such processes are implicated 
in the 2008 financial crisis. , Hayles observes The problem here is that that the algorithms that 
process responsible for processing financial data suffer from both hypermnesia (having to 
process masses of data in real time) and hypomnesia (having to jettison the data in a matter of 
seconds once it has served its purpose). ‘Humans may set up these systems, but they are not in 
complete control of how they operate, evolve, and mutate’ (p. 172). Moreover, alongside 
other technical devices, cognitive assemblages also include ‘overtly political concerns as 
racism, gender discrimination, urban infrastructural design, and institutional politics’ (p. 185).  
Like Pilsch, Hayles concludes her study by examining the utopian potential of cognitive 
assemblages, considering how the mid-century cybernetic paradigm promulgated by Norbert 
Wiener and his successors correctly anticipated the emergence of communications between 
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humans, nonhuman lifeforms, and machines. However, she argues that cyberneticians were 
wrong in thinking that feedback mechanisms would enable control in this future: indeed, ‘In 
fact the whole idea of control, with its historical baggage of human domination and 
exceptionalismnce, has come to seem increasingly obsolete, if not outright dangerous’ (p. 
202). Indeed, the more control is embedded within the computational paradigm, the clearer it 
becomes that complete control over systems is impossible. This is where a digital humanism 
can come into its own: the various thinkers, writers, and activists on whose work Hayles 
builds have one thing in common—they took the time to understand the system in detail, after 
which they were able to identify where change might be introduced to transform the system 
dynamics, while drawing on traditions of fair play, justice, sustainability, and environmental 
ethics. We live in an age where machine cognition is becoming increasingly complex and 
entangled with that of humans, raising a gamut of ethical and existential challenges. 
Assemblages promise a fairer and more just world for not only our futures, but those of 
nonhumans and indeed machines. 
As the disruptive, necessary challenges articulated by Srnicek, Pislch, and Hayles, among 
others, make clear, the DH are now sufficiently mature as a field of enquiry. Indeed, this is 
reified by the appearance each year of growing numbers of collections that seek either to 
provide a general overview or to inflect specific theoretical or practical approaches to the 
field. Joseph Tabbi’s The Bloomsbury Handbook of Electronic Literature is a compendious 
collection sectioned into four thematic sections—‘Ends, Beginnings’, ‘Poetics, Polemics’, 
‘Materialities, Ontologies’, ‘Economies, Precarities’—and comprising twenty-seven essays. 
The underpinning aim of the collection is ‘[t]o make our digitized thought ways and affective 
passages strange again’ (8), not from the position of the avant-garde periphery but from the 
disciplinary mainstream. Jentery Sayers’s Making Things and Drawing Boundaries: 
Experiments in the Digital Humanities is an interdisciplinary collection of thirty-eight essays 
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and blog posts focusing on ‘maker’ culture. Part of the Debates in the Digital Humanities 
series, which we have examined in previous years, Sayers’s volume aspires to ‘demonstrate 
how creative and critical activity may be combined to engage—in media res—cultural issues. 
[…] technologies are comparable to the stuff of art, history, language, and culture: not 
something we control or master bur rather a relationship we negotiate with some skepticism 
and surprise’ (11). Complementing Sayers’s collection, Andrew Hoskins’s Digital Memory 
Studies: Media Pasts in Transitions considers the challenges facing creative works once they 
have transitioned into archival artefacts in the digital age. The thirteen essays in this 
collection are gathered into four sections, which deal with connectivity, archaeology, 
economy, and the archive. Hoskins explores the new memory ecology built on 
hyperconnectivity, rather than symbolic orders, which can be both liberating and fraught with 
new complexities, such that 
In an era of big data dominated by big platforms, humanists have tomust treat the digital 
seriously and move away from occlusive contrasts between ‘digital’ and ‘non-digital’. Indeed, 
‘[w]orking with digital humanities requires a new kind of critical approach to computational 
thought, which we call computational thinking’ (p. 40). Computational thinking emerges from 
an algorithmic phroenesis, wisdom that builds on action (in contrast to techné, purely 
technical knowledge of the craft or art): a kind of ‘know-how’ rather than a ‘knowing-that’. 
The exponential growth of social media over the last decade has transformed modern culture 
and its everyday practices. The corporate media titans of yesteryear have been toppled by 
younger companies that have embraced Web 2.0: Facebook, Google, Apple, Amazon (p. 50). 
The forward momentum of these companies is towards sophisticating aArtificial iIntelligence 
(nowadays relabelled ‘machine learning’) processes in order to improve revenues. In the age 
of social media, our identities are increasingly algorithmic, making it incumbent on humanists 
to take a stake in future developments. Indeed, while the DH are making productive use of big 
Commented [NB21]: Isn't the correct term 'phronesis' (or is 
this something different)? 
Commented [AM22R21]: No, you’re right: it should be 
‘phronesis’: this was a dancing-finger typo. 
Commented [NB23]: Not capitalized elsewhere, so I've 
standardised to lower case. 
Commented [AM24R23]: Thanks! 
23 
data, practitioners can complement distant reading approaches with ‘nearly close reading’ 
models, such that ‘the focus should be on research infrastructures that intensify and allow 
creative forms of humanities research for the twenty-first century, not their replacement by 
science as a hegemonic form of knowledge creation’ (p. 84).  Machine code, for example, can 
no longer be seen as neutral or ahistorical, but is deeply rooted in the socioeconomic 
circumstances of its generation, stimulating all kinds of aesthetic and ethical questions that 
demand we read code and its conventions closely. We need to interpret code in order to 
describe the digital world, especially where deep understanding rather than mere explanation 
is required. 
Berry and Fagerjord invoke Bernard Stiegler’s concerns (raised in What Makes Life Worth 
Living: On Pharmacology [2013]) regarding the breakdown of the ‘long circuits’ of 
theoretical knowledge, as digitalization renders the materials we examine become 
increasingly fragmented and the processes we use to analyse them become ever more opaque 
to us:  
This Stiegler diagnoses as a serious danger to societies as they deconstruct the very 
structures of education and learning on which they are built. […] Thus, we enter a 
time of a new illegibility, in which we might say that we can no longer read what we 
are writing—we increasingly rely on digital technology both to write and to read for 
us as a form of algorithmic inspiration. (p. 69) 
The relationship between fragmentation and delimited knowledge circuits in the making of 
DH resources also points to a key tension within higher education: the growing importance of 
infrastructure in research projects, particularly when the digital component becomes a fetish 
for success. The authors inveigh against this economic model of the DH as bringing 
humanities into instrumentalism. Moreover, they insist that while the DH cannot simply 
translate the ‘old’ humanities into new formats (from ‘paper to file, library to database’), they 
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also should not be ‘the conduit by which the “humanities” are “modernized” or 
“rationalized”’ to service economic agendas (p. 83). 
If computers can aid close, qualitative reading, ‘scaling up’ can conversely be seen as a 
humanistic endeavour, suited to addressing broader cultural and philosophical questions, and 
not solely the purview of science. ’‘[D]igital humanists can actively contribute […] as a form 
of critique and as a thoughtful contribution to ensuring that critical, intellectual and 
hermeneutic specificities are defended, as well as being augmented, through new research 
infrastructures’ (p. 104). For the authors of Digital Humanities, the challenge facing the field 
is that we need to uncover the politics behind algorithms and software by deconstructing 
things as well as building them. What Berry and Fagerjord propose is a plurality of 
approaches, whereby the critical DH can extend the methods already available through the 
traditional humanities, while productively slowing down DH work to incorporate reflection 
and to resist instrumentalism. To meet these ambitions, they propose three areas of focus for 
DH practitioners who might wish to be guided by ‘a more interventionist and activist role’ (p. 
144). Firstly, we need to interrogate how infrastructure interacts with society and culture, for 
example in the drift towards ‘platformization’ analysed by Srnicek; secondly, we must 
consider the impact of our data profiles in the digital world, especially where quantification 
and surveillance by third parties and governmental agencies are involved; finally, we need to 
engage with ‘how visibility is made problematic when mediated through computational 
systems’ (p. 146), particularly as far aswhere gender and race are concerned, ensuring a voice 
is given to those who might otherwise be excluded by the digital age.  
James Smithies’s The Digital Humanities and the Modern Digital reminds us that 
technological modernity has always had its detractors—the resistance to computing within 
certain enclaves of the humanities is only the latest example. Smithies offers a scathing 
critique of the anti-DH movement, while pointing out how practitioners of the DH have laid 
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themselves open to attack by their emphasis on production rather than theorization. 
Nevertheless, as observed by Berry and Fagerjord, the DH are well positioned to critically 
interrogate critically of itsmodernity’s processes and ideologies. The organizing principle, 
indeed the counterpart to the DH, is what Smithies terms ‘the digital modern’:  
To understand the digital humanities we have to apprehend the structural nature of 
digital culture and society, and we must remember that the field is unavoidably 
influenced by postindustrial capitalism and it associated sociopolitical machinery. […] 
The digital modern has little interest in the humanist tradition. It is brittle, 
contradictory, heterogeneous, networked, hierarchical and non-hierarchical, elitist and 
democratic. (pp. 18–19)  
Invoking the work of Anthony Giddens, Smithies locates the digital modern within a second, 
‘reflexive modernity’. This second modernity is different from postmodernity, as it makes the 
consequences of modernity more radicalized and universalized than before. Turning inward, 
modernity radicalizes itself by disrupting the certainties of industrial society and replacing 
them with ‘uncertainty and chaos’ (p. 23). Nowhere is this more evident than in the rise of 
cognitive or information capital, which transcends the boundaries of the nation- state, being 
routed instead by through the neoliberal logic of global capitalism. 
One consequence of second modernity’s instrumentalization of knowledge production is 
the discourse of ‘’crisis’ that attaches itself to the humanities. Smithies examines how this 
rhetoric has been deployed by conservative commentators in the US, particularly in relation to 
the DH. (He identifies Francis Fukuayama and David Golumbia as prominent voices in this 
camp.) Of course, this anti-computational angst is not only solely the purview of 
conservatives, and is shared by left-leaning academics who associate the DH with oppressive 
mainstream culture and politics. Smithies frames this resistance within a longer tradition of 
humanist scepticism towards technical work, which has been itself a major achievement of the 
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humanities over the last three centuries. Nevertheless, a more nuanced response is needed, as 
exemplified by scholars like Alan Liu, whose ‘work presents a critique of digital technology 
that positions it as a subject area worthy of further development, rather than a threat in need of 
proscription’ (p. 61). Information society has resulted in the exponential growth in computing 
as the primary driver of the twenty-first global economy, placing the DH in at an important 
critical juncture. 
Smithies identifies three key specific aspects of computational culture that merit further 
investigation by the DH: artificial intelligence (AI), cyberinfrastructure, and the 
‘multistability’ of computers. In Heidegger’s dystopian vision, as technology advances on its 
own solipsistic logic, it ‘enframes’ our interactions with the world in increasingly insular 
ways, limiting human action and thought. Artificial I intelligence also weakens the power of 
intellectuals and diminishes the role of expert knowledge—we can see this manifest itself in 
our increasingly normalized ’Let’s‘Let’s-Google-that’ instincts. ‘The instability of knowledge 
related to artificial intelligence and automation feed into a sense of incipient risk’ (p. 81). 
Cyberinfrastructure is the glue that binds disciplines together, ‘a complex interpretative 
domain, characterised by a blend of technical, cultural, and sociopolitical factors that combine 
to resist simple elucidation’ (p. 113). Smithies notes that a ‘systems analysis of the 
humanities’ must begin with an acceptance that technologies are the very medium of human 
existence (p. 114). He suggests that technology should be understood as a network of 
complex sociotechnological systems, deeply embedded in if not constitutive of society 
itself—in many ways echoing Hayles’s concept of assemblages, discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Smithies is another commentator pointing to the centrality of platform studies and 
further examination of open standards in shaping our relationship to cyberinfrastructure. This 
is especially salient given the multistabilty of technologiesy, which: he Smithies identifies this 
as their ‘tendency to develop organically beyond the intentions of their original designers […] 
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[implying] entanglement between humans and our technologies’ (p. 153).  
Countering Heidegger’s oppositional model of humanity versus technology, Smithies 
adopts a ‘postphenomenological’ approach that which posits that locates technologies are as 
the medium of human existence, focusing in particular on software: ‘When viewed as a 
technology entangled with human identity and creative expression, software becomes a 
medium—necessarily limited, like pen, paper, and card catalogue—that humanists can use to 
gain knowledge about the world’ (p. 154). While postphenomenology can assist our 
understanding of the entanglements between technology and humanity, for Smithies, it is not 
enough to help us analyse the operation of research itself. His solution is to draw upon 
‘postfoundationalism’, which posits that all knowledge incorporates both facts and theories 
simultaneously: ‘Rather than cleaving to the notion that research can provide access to a 
world of perfectly objective truth, postfoundationalism claims that robust methods and 
appropriate levels of critical awareness can lead as close to it as is needed for effective 
engagement with the world’ (p. 161). Knowledge thus emerges from the interplay between 
different perspectives and multiple intellects, using a range of tools and methods in 
multidisciplinary approaches—breaking away from the ’lone scholar’ model traditionally 
associated with the humanities. (We might recall the similarities between Smithies’s 
definition of knowledge and Hayles’s for understanding as cognitively embedded within the 
environment, as discussed earlier in this chapter.) We can employ a panoply of computational 
tools—algorithmic criticism, distant reading, data modelling—but we need to be seerecognize 
these as interpretative, critical interventions, rather than as empirical, comprehensive 
solutions. Indeed, uncertainty itself can productively yield new perspectives when we are 
faced with massive datasets and multifarious ways of crunching the data—especially during 
an age when machine-learning processes will continue to separate humanists increasingly 
from their materials. 
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